State of Utah v. Carol A. Fix : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
State of Utah v. Carol A. Fix : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Laszlo Daroczi; Deputy Weber County Attorney; Attorney for Appellee.
Martin Custen; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Fix, No. 950045 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6402
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CAROL A. FIX, 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 950Q9£CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
STANTON M. TAYLOR, DISTRICT JUDGE. 
LASZLO DAROCZI 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
2549 Washington Blvd., 7th Floor 
Ogden, UT 84401 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 
MARTIN CUSTEN 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
UTAH C O ? f - T O F APPEALS-
UTAH 
DC 
K i" *J 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET t <o.m^ 
FILECr 
JUH 1 3 1995 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Priority No. 2 
vs. 
CAROL A. FIX, Case No. 950093-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
STANTON M. TAYLOR, DISTRICT JUDGE. 
LASZLO DAROCZI 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
2549 Washington Blvd., 7th Floor 
Ogden, UT 84401 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 
MARTIN CUSTEN 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 6 
I. WAS THE EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A VERDICT 
THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN 
INJURY ACCIDENT? 6 
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DISALLOWING EVIDENCE OF 
STATE'S WITNESS' INTENT TO SUE DEFENDANT? 9 
CONCLUSION 11 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse. 236 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 8, 9 
State v. Goddard. 871 P .2d 540 (Utah '94) 8 
State v. Hackford. 737 P.2d 200 (Utah '87) 10 
State v. John. 770 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah '89) 7 
State v. Rammel. 721 P.2d 498 (Utah '86) 10 
State v. Romero. 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 76) 8 
State v. Scheel. 823 P.2d 470 (Utah App. '91) 7 
State in the Interest of M.S.. 781 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah App. '89) 7 
STATUTES 
Section 41-6-31 (1) Utah Code Annotated 1,2 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) Utah Code Annotated 1 
Rule 608(C), Utah Rules of Evidence 2, 10 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Priority No. 2 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
CAROL A. FIX, : Case No. 950093-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a-
3(2) (f) Utah Code Annotated. 
On November 4, 1994, a jury convicted Defendant of Leaving the Scene of an 
Injury Accident, a class "A" misdemeanor, in violation of § 41-6-31 Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support a verdict of Leaving the Scene of an 
Injury Accident? 
Standard of review: Appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's 
verdict, then demonstrate how this evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light, is 
insufficient to support the verdict. An appellate court will reverse on the basis of 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence is so inconclusive or improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant 
committed the crime. 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error by excluding evidence of State's 
witness' intent to sue defendant? 
Standard of review: The trial court's ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Appellant must show that the error would have had a substantial influence in bringing 
about a different verdict. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Section 41-6-31 Utah Code Annotated, Leaving the Scene of an Injury Accident, 
a class "A" misdemeanor. 
Wording not at issue 
Rule 608(c), Utah Rules of Evidence: Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any 
motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness . . . by examination of the 
witness . . . 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant/Appellant, Ms. Fix, was driving in Ogden on March 25,1994, in mid-day. 
Another driver, Lori BRYAN, felt Defendant was following too close and showed the 
Defendant the "finger.'1 The Defendant was upset by this and followed Lori Bryan through 
the streets of Ogden, then up Ogden Canyon and to a day-care center where Lori Bryan 
was to pick up her child. Some strong words were exchanged before Lori Bryan went 
into the day-care center, having noted Defendant's license number. Defendant then 
proceeded to spit at and into Lori Bryan's car. 
Normand Knudson was in the yard with his father and heard the verbal exchange 
and saw the Defendant spitting into the car. He walked toward the Defendant's car as 
2 
she began to drive away. He held up one hand to stop her car since the day-care was 
private property and posted with "No Trespassing" signs. Knudson worked at the day-
care and his mother operated it. The Defendant continued to drive forward and hit 
Knudson who rolled on her hood and landed on his feet falling against a chain link fence. 
Defendant continued to drive away and did not return. The Deputy Sheriff responding 
to the call was given the address by dispatch of the departing car's license number. He 
went to that address and obtained a statement from the Defendant about the incident. 
Then he went to the scene at the day-care and spoke with Lori Bryan, Mr. Knudson and 
his father. The Defendant was then charged with Aggravated Assault and Leaving the 
Scene of an Injury Accident. 
THE TRIAL 
After Lori Bryan testified, Mr. Knudson testified that he could hear the confrontation 
between Lori Bryan and the Defendant. He heard Lori say "I've got your license plate, 
you're on private property. I'm going in the house to call the police and you need to 
leave." On the defendant's part he heard "lots of profanity." P.1, Vol. 1. 
Knudson observed "what appeared to be spitting . . . and within seconds of that 
the car sped towards me and she hit me and she didn't slow down. She just took off 
and sped out of the bridge. I pushed myself as much as I could from the side of the car 
because in my mind I was afraid of being squished between the car or falling into the 
fence and getting thrown back under the rear tires," P. 62, Vol. 2. 
"When I did come off the car, by the time I was able to get turned around to try 
and get a license plate number. . . all I seen was the very back of the car speeding off 
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. . . I realized I was going to be hit when s he was coming toward me, I took a couple of 
steps backward, I put my hand out to try and motion for her," P. 3, Vol 1. 
As for Knudson's injuries: "When I jumped in the air and the car hit me on my 
legs, it threw me onto the hood of the car. I hit pretty hard .. . onto the car with my body 
and that shoulder," P.65, Vol. 1. 
"I slammed the same shoulder into the fence it was all in less than a second . . . 
I also sustained some injuries to my right knee. IVe had problems with my knee 
dislocating since then," P.66, Vol 1. 
Knudson testified he was "in home therapy, as far as stretching and exercising and 
things like that," P.65, Vol. 1. More on the injures: "I had some minor scrapes on my 
hands. I was wearing a thick levi jacket. It had some pretty serious scuffs and scrapes 
on it, but nothing wore through my jacket to my skin on my arms," P. 69, Vol 1. 
"I was definitely in a lot of severe pain in my right arm and right shoulder." 
Knudson testified he sustained bruises but they may not have been visible to the naked 
eye. "Not the naked eye, I guess. I don't know. I can't see my back . . . I didn't look in 
a mirror," P.83, Vol. 1. 
After Defendant drove away she did not return to the scene. P. 123, Vol. 1. 
As to Knudson's bias against defendant, Knudson testified, "This woman is a threat 
to society," P. 69, Vol. 1. Also, "anybody who would run somebody down for no reason 
was a threat to society and I was concerned that she could get in her car and put a key 
in it and go out and hit somebody else. I never met the lady. I didn't know her from 
anyone and I was very agitated that someone could do something so heinous and still 
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have the ability to get behind the wheel of a car and go out and do it again to someone 
else if they choose," P. 71, Vol. 1. 
The Deputy also testified about how Knudson felt toward Defendant. "Did Mr. 
Knudson tell you that he wanted Carol Fix jailed for Attempted Homicide and held without 
bail?" "He did" replied the Deputy. P. 149, Vol. 1. "Did he state to you that he would find 
out where Carol lives and take care of the problem himself?" Answer: "He said 
something to that affect, yes, and I advised him not do so, otherwise there would be 
charges filed against him," P. 150, Vol. 1. 
In his closing statement defense counsel said on the issue of Mr. Knudson's injury 
or lack of injury: "There is no damage to the grille. There is no damage. There is no 
injury. There is no visible injury. None of the rest matters if there was no injury," P. 214, 
Vol, 2. "And if that's the amount of pain Mr. Knudson felt from the car, then that's not the 
kind of pain that's described in these instructions. It has to be substantial pain." P. 215, 
Vol. 2. 
The jury acquitted the Defendant of Aggravated Assault and convicted her of 
Leaving the Scene of an Injury Accident. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First Issue: Was the evidence insufficient to support the verdict? Rather than 
marshalling the evidence supporting the verdict, Defendant marshals the evidence pro 
and con then argues for a reversal. Defendant urges that an injury suffered in the instant 
case must be an "objectively observable injury." But defendant did not object to the 
instruction given nor asked for additional or different instruction on "injury." 
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Second Issue: Does the trial court's refusal to allow questioning of Knudson re: 
intent to sue Defendant, warrant a reversal? 
It is harmless error since Knudson's bias was already obvious to the jury! 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant raises the first issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support 
the verdict of failure to Remain at the Scene of an Injury Accident. Defense counsel 
chose to challenge in this appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. 
The State points out that at the end of the trial Defendant moved to arrest judgement on 
the very issue of sufficiency of the evidence as to the type and degree of injury suffered 
by Knudson. That motion ^ vas denied. The State submits that the proper recourse would 
have been to appeal the denial of the motion to arrest judgement. 
The State argues that the appellate court can dispose of the first issue even before 
deciding whether defendant meets the burden of marshaling the evidence. The key is 
Defendant's argument in the first paragraph on page 21 of the brief. Here Defendant 
muses about whether the injury suffered should be subjective or objective. The evidence 
is then marshalled to amplify on this topic. 
As to what type or degree of injury is contemplated by the statute of failing to 
remain at the scene of an injury accident, on page 2 of the brief, defense counsel "could 
not find any Utah case law on the issue of whether there is an objective or subjective 
standard for the findings of the jury." Yet defense counsel goes on undaunted, "Either 
way, it is submitted that there must be objective evidence of injury." 
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Instruction 19 to the jury reads as follows: "Bodily injury" means physical pain, 
illness or any impairment of physical condition. 
Defendant did not object to said instruction nor offered additional or different 
instruction on the issue of "injury." 
Since Defendant failed to raise this issue at the trial court level he cannot now raise 
it at the appellate level. "It is a fundamental principle of appellate review that matters not 
raised at the trial level cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." State in the Interest 
of M.S.. 781 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah 1989). See also State v. John, 770 P.2d 994, 995 
(Utah 1989). 
As to marshaling the evidence: Defense counsel cites the correct standard of 
review then proceeds to do violence to that standard. 
Defendant cites the case of State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1991) which 
does define the standard. "This court has limited authority to examine a jury verdict 
challenged on the sufficiency of the evidence. We review the evidence and all references 
which may be reasonably drawn in the light must favorable to the verdict. . . reversing 
only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant 
committed the crime. Furthermore, Defendant must marshall all evidence supporting the 
jury's verdict and must then show how this marshaled evidence is insufficient to support 
the verdict even when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." 
In Defendant's brief under the heading Marshaling the Evidence, defense counsel 
devotes in a summarized form to the marshaling evidence most favorable to the verdict 
7 
an entire paragraph, (page 15, second paragraph of brief), out of more than three and 
a half pages. The rest of that section is devoted to evidence marshaled to put the 
Defendant's case in a best light, i.e., "Ms. Fix gave an entirely different version . . . the 
only evidence o f . . . Knudson's . . . injury . . . came from his own testimony . . . Ms. Fix's 
statement, when read in its entirety, does not support a finding of injury . . . Mr. Fix 
testified that there was no impact with Normand Knudson . . . she was frightened and 
left." 
In marshaling the evidence defense refers repeatedly to evidence offered by the 
State's witnesses as not credible. In State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976) also 
cited by defense, the hi<\h court says "Further, this court has maintained that its function 
is not to determine guilt or innocence, the weight to give conflicting evidence, the 
credibility of witnesses, or the weight to be given Defendant's testimony. In State v. 
Goddard, 871 P.2d 540 (Utah 1994) the high court also states, "However, she is not 
entitled to reversal of her conviction simply because her version of the facts are different 
from the State's or simply because there are some gaps in the State's evidence. The 
existence of contradictory evidence does not warrant disturbing the jury's verdict... The 
jury need not accept the Defendant's version of the facts but may disregard it in whole 
or in part. In essence Goddard urges us to retry the facts of this case on appeal, and 
we refuse to do so." 
In the case of Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, 236 Utah Adv. 
Rep 24, the Court of Appeals said "This rigorous standard reflects the doctrine that 
appellate courts do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed facts. Accordingly, when 
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the duty to marshall is not properly discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of 
challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid . . . Oneida has failed to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's factual findings. Rather than bearings 
it's marshaling burden, Oneida has merely presented carefully selected facts and excerpts 
of trial testimony in support of its position. Such selective citation to the record does not 
begin to marshal the evidence; it is nothing more than an attempt to reargue the case 
before this court - a tactic that we reject." 
The State submits that the Defendant here indeed seeks to retry her case before 
this court by citing carefully selected facts and excerpts of trial testimony in support of 
her position. 
AS TO THE SECOND ISSUE: Did the trial court err in refusing to allow evidence 
of Normand Knudson's intention to sue Defendant? The State submits that this was 
harmless error. On Page 98, 99 Vol. 1, the transcript reflects the following exchange: 
Mr. Custen: Mr. Knudson, do you intend to sue Carol Fix for money damages? 
Mr. Daroczi: Objection, irrelevant. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Custen: May I approach? 
The Court: No, Sustained. 
Mr. Custen: May I be heard outside of the presence of the Jury? 
The Court: No, sustained. 
Mr. Custen: May I make a record? 
The Court: We'll allow you to make a record afterwards. 
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This exchange was in the presence of the jury. 
The State agrees with defense counsel that Rule 608(c) Utah Rules of Evidence, 
does allow such evidence in as evidence of bias. It was error to exclude it. The issue 
becomes whether it was reversible or harmless error. 
Defense counsel cites on Page 2 of his brief under Standard of Review the case 
of State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah '87). Hackford is applicable and the State 
concedes error in violation of Rule 608(c). The State further submits that the analysis in 
Hackford is also applicable as to whether the error was harmless. The court in Hackford 
states, "Although we concede that Lane's testimony was a critical part of the case against 
Hackford, the jury had sufficient information to fully appraise Lane's biases and 
motivations . . . therefore, we find beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court's error 
was harmless." 
In the instant case the jury was well aware from the testimony of Knudson and the 
Deputy that Knudson was not only biased against but was incensed at the Defendant. 
Therefore, the court's denial of Defendant's request to show that Knudson was biased 
by his intent to sue Defendant, caused no harm. Defense counsel also cites the case of 
State v. Rammel. 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986) which is helpful on this issue as well. In 
Rammel, the high court states, "Where it is unlikely that the excluded testimony prejudiced 
the defendant's rights in a substantial manner, the error is harmless . . . courts have 
found no prejudice where information that may be brought out by further questioning was 
already before the jury either from the testimony of others or by implication from the 
witness' own testimony." In Rammel the "jury was well aware of Herman's possible 
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motivation for testifying as he did . . . Herman admitted that he had some very angry 
feelings about what had happened. The jury also heard, and was not told to ignore, the 
question posed as to whether Herman had instituted civil proceedings against Defendant. 
We therefore conclude that although it was error to limit the cross-examination as to 
Herman's bias and motive, the error was not prejudicial because additional cross-
examination would not have had a substantial influence to bring about a different verdict." 
The State submits that the fact situation on this issue is nearly identical with the 
instant case: The jury heard and was not told to ignore defense counsel's question 
whether Knudson intended to sue Defendant; the jury was well aware that Knudson had 
some very angry feelings about what had happened. The State asks that the court follow 
the reasoning and ruling of Rammel. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The State asks that the court affirm Defendant's conviction for Defendant's failure 
to meet the standard of review as to both issues raised by the Defendant. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS NOT REQUESTED 
Respectfully submitted this /J- day of June, 1995. 
LES DAROCZI X V . ^S 
DEPUTY WEBER C0UNTY ATTORNEY 
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